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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, Francis Crick and James D. Watson deduced the
structure of DNA's I double helix, founding the new science of
molecular biology.2 In the spring of 2003, scientists announced a
completed map of the human genome, a final goal of the Human
Genome Project ("HGP"), which began in 1986 with the seemingly
impossible dream of mapping and sequencing all the genes of the
human body.3 In a mere half century, DNA technology has joined the
1. "DNA" is the acronym for deoxyribonucleic acid.
2. Nicholas Wade, Watson and Crick, Both Aligned and Apart, Reinvented Biology,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at F3.
3. Nicholas Wade, Once Again, Scientists Say the Human Genome Is Complete, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at Fl. In 1986, the Human Genome Project began in the United
States when scientists embarked on a series of studies to determine whether a large-scale
effort to map and sequence the genes of the human body was possible. See Jared A.
Feldman & Richard J. Katz, Genetic Testing and Discrimination in Employment:
Recommending a Uniform Statutory Approach, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 392
(2002); NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., JUST THE FACTS:
A BASIC
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING NCBI RESOURCES: BIOINFORMATICS,

at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/bioinformatics.html (last revised Mar. 29,
2004) [hereinafter NCBI, JUST THE FACTS] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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tools in the physician's medical bag, allowing sophisticated testing for
the diagnosis of, and the predisposition to, numerous diseases.'
Scientists continue to use their new mastery of genetics to discover
causes of disease by combining information from the completed map6
of all human genes with extensive studies of symptomatic patients.
While this process is more advanced for some diseases than others,7

more than 4,000 diseases are believed to have some genetic
component.
Genetic screening for specific diseases cannot perfectly predict
all instances of disease, nor is it a panacea to eradicate all human
disease. 9

Because a disease may be caused by a single genetic

mutation, several genetic mutations, or several genetic mutations
working in concert with an individual's environment, 0 genetic
The project became multinational, with France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom all taking part. Feldman & Katz, supra, at 392. In 2000, scientists announced
completion of a majority of the project, which initially was not supposed to be finished
until years later. See Wade, supra. While scientists had sequenced the genome at that
time, it could be described as a "working draft"-much work remained to determine
which parts of the sequence were genes and which parts were "junk DNA," to which
scientists could not ascribe a purpose. See id.
4. For a list of current tests available, see Human Genome Project Information,
Gene
Testing,
at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/medicine/
genetest.html#testsavailable (last modified Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
5. Andrew Pollack, How the Arms of the Helixes Are Poised to Serve, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2003, at F5.
6. NCBI, JUST THE FACTS, supra note 3. Symptomatic patients are those whose
disease is currently being expressed by symptoms. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1805 (30th ed. 2003) [hereinafter DORLAND'S DICTIONARY].
Genetic testing can help symptomatic patients by determining the exact cause of
symptoms-the first step to combating illness. See EDWIN H. MCCONKEY, HUMAN
GENETICS: THE MOLECULAR REVOLUTION 189-92 (1993) (discussing treatment of
Phenylketonuria after genetic screening of infants).
7. For example, genetic tests are currently available for about 930 diseases, including
breast cancer, Huntington's disease, and Tay-Sachs disease. Pollack, supra note 5.
Scientists expect tests for other diseases, such as Alzheimer's, to be available in the next
five years. Lee Bowman, Genetics May Show Risk for Disease, HERALD-SUN (Durham,
N.C.), Feb. 15,2003, at A6.
8. See Access Excellence Resource Center, Understanding Gene Testing: How Are
Genes Linked to Disease?, at http://www.accessexcellence.org/AE/AEPC/NIH/
gene05.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see
also DAVID L. RIMOIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 37

(4th ed. 2002) ("Perhaps we should require a disease to be shown not to be associated with
any genetic variation, before saying it has no genetic basis.").
9. See GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL

NORMS 94-97 (2002).
10. For example, Phenylketonuria ("PKU") is a genetic disorder affecting one child in
10,000 that is caused by the inability to metabolize the amino acid phenylalanine. See
Henry T. Greely, Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative
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screening can ascertain only the probability of developing a disorder,
not its certainty.11 Not everyone with a particular genetic defect will
develop the corresponding disease. t2 Therefore, the most that genetic
screening can usually discover is that one person has an increased
likelihood over another of developing a particular disease at some
point in his or her life.13
Advances in genetics have led many to postulate that rampant
genetic discrimination is inevitable. t4 For example, employers may be
interested in knowing whether one of their potential employees has
an increased disease risk over another potential employee. Fears of
genetic discrimination have led to a number of law review articles
suggesting various forms of non-discrimination legislation. 5 This
Comment joins that group, but in so doing, seeks a middle ground
between a "don't ask, don't tell" genetics gag order-the privacy
model that could deny the benefits of the genetic revolution to make
workplaces safer16 -and the open-hand, economic efficiency model

that would seem to reward all discrimination and turn society into
genetic "haves" and "have-nots."17 Further, it seeks to avoid
accusations of "genetics exceptionalism"' 8 created by genetics antidiscrimination legislation that may inadvertently elevate genetic
illness over environmental illness and other forms of disease.
Part I of this Comment will explore the precision of genetic
Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2001). Failure to metabolize this amino acid

results in mental retardation. Id. But if a child can be screened at birth for this disorder,
then a diet low in phenylalanine will prevent it. Id.
11. Id.; see Human Genome Project Information, Gene Testing, at
http://www.ornl.govfrechResources/Human Genome/medicine/genetest.html#procon
(last modified Dec. 9, 2003) [hereinafter HGPI, Pros and Cons] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
12. HGPI, Pros and Cons, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. See Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 395; Brian Holt, Genetically Defective: The
Judicial Interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Fails to Protect Against
Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 460 (2002)

(stating that "employers have embraced tests that detect genetic predispositions"); Pauline
T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination,Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a
Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (2002).
15. See generally Feldman & Katz, supra note 3 (suggesting a model statute); Holt,
supra note 14 (advocating for changes to Title VII); Kim, supra note 14 (advocating for
privacy rights legislation).
16. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 14, at 1532 (advocating for a privacy rights model).
17. See, e.g., Kathleen Taradash, Preventing a Market for "Lemons": A Voluntary
Disclosure Model as an Alternative to the Prohibition of Genetic Discrimination and the
Distortion of Allocative Efficiency, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1382 (2002) (advocating a job
market free of anti-genetic discrimination laws).
18. See infra Part III.C.
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testing in predicting the onset of diseases that may directly threaten
productivity and safety in the workplace. 9 Part II will examine how
current law could impact potential claimants of genetic
discrimination,2 ° focusing on the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"),2' Executive Order 13,145,22 the Health Insurance
24
23
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Title VII,
state laws,' and pending legislation.26 Part III will examine several
proposed remedies and will craft a practical and effective remedy of
its own.27 Specifically, this Comment will argue that the ADA should
be modified to provide limited protection for the most genetically atrisk, but allow the market to protect the larger mass of society with a
less risky genome.28 In so doing, this proposed remedy will combine
the strengths of other proposed remedies, while minimizing their
weaknesses, particularly their reliance on future government
subsidies to the genetically unfortunate.29
19. See infra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 78-199 and accompanying text.
21. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2000)).
22. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 F.R. § 6877 (2000), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West Supp. 2003).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26,29, and 42 U.S.C.).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
25. At least thirty-two states have enacted some form of legislation preventing the use
of genetic discrimination in employment. See National Conference of State Legislatures,
State Genetics Employment Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programslhealth/genetics/
ndiscrim.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter National Conference on State
Legislatures] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. § 202
(2003), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
27. See infra notes 200-70 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 22 (2d ed.
1971) (concluding that race discrimination in labor markets has costs both for the victim
and the perpetrator); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination:
Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) ("Prejudice in markets is
always costly to the parties who practice it.").
29. To date, universal health care has not been passed, although it is often supported
by various politicians. See Dean for America, Promoting American Health, at
http://www.deanforamerica.com/site/PageServer?pagename=policy-statement health (last
visited Nov. 1, 2003) (advocating for universal health care) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Dick Gephardt for President, Matt's Plan: Health Care for All, at
http://www.dickgephardt2004.com/plugin/template/gephardt33 (last visited Nov. 1, 2003)
(advocating for universal health care) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Kucinich on the Issues, Universal Health Care, at http://www.kucinich.us/issuesl
issueuniversalhealth.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) (advocating for universal health care)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Michael Rothschild, Why Health
Care Reform Died, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1994, at A10 (discussing the failure of President
Clinton's health care plan).
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Despite the uncertainties, genetic information is valuable.
Beyond the value to an individual of knowledge of future risk, 0
employers and insurers may value information about an individual's
propensity for disease. 3' Such knowledge could help employers make
decisions between two equally qualified potential employees. It could
potentially lessen that employer's future worker's compensation or
insurance costs, as well as costs associated with employee absence. It
could also help the employer provide a safer workplace by
eliminating applicants whose genetic makeup increases their risk of
adverse reaction to materials present in the particular work
environment or who could face danger due to the unexpected onset
of disease.32
Some of these uses imply a dangerous form of discrimination that
could divide the nation into two classes-the genetically superior and
the genetically inferior who could be condemned to second-class
treatment.33 Theoretically, employers could decide that it is too risky
or expensive to employ or train people with genetic predispositions
for certain diseases or other conditions.
Those with the
predisposition for terminal diseases could find themselves passed over
for management or promotions, leading to a spiral of unemployment,
poverty, and homelessness. But some uses, applying to those with the
less risky genomes, while perhaps seemingly unfair to the individual,
may be better for both individuals and society as a whole.
To illustrate this concept, this Comment uses three
Many writers on this topic see universal health care-or subsidies for those
genetically predisposed to the worst illnesses-as a potential solution. See Robert A.
Bohrer, A Rawlsian Approach to Solving the Problem of Genetic Discriminationin Toxic
Workplaces, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 763 (2002); Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow
Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1439, 1482 (2001); Taradash, supra note 17, at 1388. These comments reflect an economic
efficiency argument, which is discussed infra at Part III.B.
30. See, e.g., LAURIE, supra note 9, at 114 ("It is axiomatic that a person who has been
tested for one or more genetic conditions has a significant interest in knowing, and
determining what happens to, the resulting information.").
31. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 14, at 1502 (stating that genetic privacy in the workplace
is often discussed).
32. For example, a growing body of evidence suggests that some people have a
predisposition to an elevated risk from exposure to benzene, a workplace chemical, which
can cause cancer. See Bohrer, supra note 29, at 754-55 n.25. If employees were screened
for benzene sensitivity, the workplace could become safer for them. Id.
33. But, since everyone's genome contains some disease risk, it will be likely that
those with a predisposition for developing more costly, incurable diseases will be the
genetically unfortunate, and those with the less costly or more curable diseases the
genetically fortunate. See Taradash, supra note 17, at 1360-61. This, of course, is not to
imply there is something morally wrong with a person who has a riskier genome, just that
it has economic considerations.
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hypothetical scenarios:
1. Employee Adam is trying to find a job as an airline
pilot. During his employment pre-screening test, Adam
is found to carry a genetic predisposition for epilepsy.
Should the employer refuse to hire him?
2. Employee Barbara is seeking a job as an accountant.
During her employment pre-screening test, Barbara is
found to carry a genetic predisposition for epilepsy.
Should the employer refuse to hire her?
3. Employee Charles is trying to find a job at an oil
refinery. During his employment pre-screening test,
Charles is found to carry a genetic predisposition for
epilepsy that scientists believe would be made worse by
exposure to oil. Should the employer refuse to hire
him?34

The first and second scenarios illustrate a predisposition for a
disease that is primarily dangerous to others, depending on the

profession; an epileptic seizure is unlikely to harm anyone at an
accounting firm, but could potentially cause an accident if it occurred
The third scenario illustrates a
during an airplane flight.
predisposition for a disease that is dangerous only to the individual35

due to the profession's environment.
I. THE SCIENCE AFFECTING GENETICS AND EMPLOYMENT

On June 26, 2000, scientists announced that they had completed
a "working draft" of the human genome 6 consisting of roughly three
billion nucleotides.3 7 Scientists refined that significant completion in
April 2003 by further filtering out "junk DNA" to isolate actual

34. Epilepsy is likely caused, in some cases, by a person's genetics.
BIOTECHNOLOGY

INFO.,

GENES

AND

DISEASE:

NAT'L CTR. FOR
EPILEPSY,
at

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/disease/Epilepsy.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
NCBI, GENES AND DISEASE] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This
scenario draws on the case of Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), in which an oil
refinery worker was denied a job because of his increased risk of liver disease when
exposed to refinery conditions. Id. at 76.
35. Theoretically, Charles's illness could be dangerous to others, for example if it
were to occur at the wrong time, such as while using hazardous chemicals or moving heavy
machinery. The point, however, is that it is primarily dangerous only to the individual.
36. See Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 392. A genome contains all the biological
information needed to build and maintain a living example of that organism. NCBI, JUST
THE FACTS, supra note 3.
37. See Wade, supra note 3.
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genes.38 What scientists have decoded can be used to discover
individual genes, which are comprised of sequences of four nucleotide
bases.3 9 Genes code for proteins, and proteins-long chains of amino
acids-in turn control body function.n
Most genetic variation occurs when DNA is duplicated;
duplication is a natural and continuous process occurring each time a
new cell is formed. n Mutations can occur in the new DNA strand
such as base substitutions (when a single base gets replaced with
another), deletions (where a base is left out), and insertions (where a
base is added).42 These mutations may have an ultimate effect on
what protein is created, and in turn, may be the source of genetic
disease.43
Most employer genetic testing will likely focus on an individual's
inherited genes, rather than on current gene mutations.' Current
gene mutation may be a very real worry in workplaces containing
hazardous chemicals, such as in the example of Charles. However,
few workplaces will likely be in this situation; therefore, an
individual's inherited genome will provide a greater source of disease
information for the majority of employers.
An individual's inherited genome consists of twenty-three pairs
of chromosomes, half inherited from the mother and half from the
father.45 Each chromosome carries a number of specified genes, some
of which have been linked to particular diseases. 46 Just how direct
that link is may be determined by whether the genetic disease is
monogenic or polygenic, a distinction that could play into
employment decisions based on the risk of future disease. Monogenic
diseases, such as Huntington's, are the direct result of a particular
mutation to a specific gene.47 Some monogenic diseases are recessive,
which means they are inherited only if both parents passed on the

38. Wade, supra note 2.
39. NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE

UNDERLYING

NCBI

INFO.,
RESOURCES:

A

BASIC INTRODUCTION TO THE
WHAT
IS
A
GENOME?,
at

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/genetics-genome.html (revised Mar. 31, 2004)
[hereinafter NCBI, BASIC INTRODUCTION] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
40. See id. Proteins include enzymes, structural components, hormones, antibodies,
and transport molecules. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 395-98.
45. NCBI, BASIC INTRODUCTION, supra note 39.
46. Id.
47. LAURIE, supra note 9, at 94-97.
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gene.48 Recessive monogenic disorders include sickle cell anemia49

and cystic fibrosis.50 Some monogenic diseases are dominant, which
means they are inherited with only one copy of the gene.51 About
50% of dominant disorders, such as Huntington's disease,52 do not
manifest until late in life.53 While the parents of a child with a
recessive disease may or may not exhibit symptoms themselves, at
least one parent of a child with a dominant disease will also exhibit
that disease.54 If both parents are carriers of a recessive disorder, any
child they have has a 25% chance of actually having the disease, a
50% chance that the child will also carry the gene but will not suffer

from the disease, and a 25 % chance of neither having nor carrying the
disease.55 In terms of a dominant disorder, a child will have a 50%
chance of having the disease
if one parent carries the gene, and a 75%
56
it.
carry
both
if
chance
Most genetic diseases are not monogenic, but polygenic,
involving an interaction of two or more defective genes.57

This

decreases the likelihood of an individual being affected by the
disease, and makes it more difficult to determine which genetic
combination caused the disease. 8 Additionally, external factors
influence many polygenic disorders, such as cancer, heart disease, and
48. For more information about recessive genes, see ALAN E. H. EMERY & DAVID L.
99-105 (2d ed. 1992)
(detailing autosomal recessive inheritance); see also Tiscali Reference: Recessive Gene, at
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/mOO08099.html
(last visited
Apr. 9, 2003) (detailing recessive gene characteristics) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
49. In healthy individuals, a gene instructs cells to produce hemoglobin, an oxygencarrying protein in the blood.
Mayo Clinic Staff, Sickle Cell Anemia, at
http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=DS00324 (July 8, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). In those with sickle cell anemia, the gene creates flawed
hemoglobin. Id.
50. Cystic Fibrosis is an inherited multi-system disorder that produces abnormal
functioning of the endocrine gland, resulting in chronic progressive disease of the
respiratory system for nearly all patients. Mayo Clinic Staff, Cystic Fibrosis (Apr. 8, 2004),
at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=DS00287 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
51. LAURIE, supra note 9, at 95.
52. Huntington's Disease is an untreatable, hereditary disorder that produces
involuntary movements and progressive dementia. Mayo Clinic Staff, Huntington's
Disease (Aug. 14, 2003), at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=DS00401 (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
53. LAURIE, supra note 9, at 94-97.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
RIMOIN, 1 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDIAL GENETICS
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diseases of the immune system, 9 by impacting both the appearance

and the progression of the disease. Some factors may include the diet
and exercise habits of the individual, her level of stress, whether she
used alcohol or drugs, and whether she has been exposed to toxic

chemicals or radiation. 6
Testing labs today provide more than 900 genetic tests, and
screening newborns for a number of diseases is common. 61 To
perform this genetic testing, scientists and doctors take a sample of
cells,62 such as a drop of blood, saliva, a cheek cell or any other
tissue. 63 These cells are cultured and isolated to purify the DNA, then

analyzed using a genetic test or studied by separating genes with gel
electrophoresis.'
Two common genetic tests are the "probe test" and the "linkage
test."65 A "probe test" involves using short pieces of DNA, or
"probes," the sequences of which are complementary to mutated
sequences.66 When they are mixed with an individual's DNA, these
probes will "seek their complement among the three billion base pairs

of an individual's genome. '

67

If the probe finds its complement, the

59. Wrong
Diagnosis,
Introduction
to
Polygenic
Disease,
at
http://www.wrongdiagnosis.com/genetics/polygenic.htm (last updated Mar. 30, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
60. LAURIE, supra note 9, at 94-97. Alzheimer's disease is an example of a polygenic
disease that may be influenced by factors external to an individual's genetic make-up. See
Bowman, supra note 7. For example, scientists recently discovered that three genes may
cause early-onset Alzheimer's disease, with a fourth gene that regulates cholesterol
metabolism putting individuals at higher risk for the disease as they grow older. Id. Other
research indicates that diets high in saturated fat increase the risk of developing
Alzheimer's. See ALZHEIMER'S ASS'N, WAVE OF ALZHEIMER RESEARCH SPOTLIGHTS
SCIENTIFIC MOMENTUM (Feb. 17, 2003), at http:// http://www.alz.org/Media/
newsreleases/2003/021703research.asp (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Thus, Alzheimer's is likely a polygenic disorder with environmental variance.
61. Human Genome Project Information, Gene Testing, at http://www.ornl.gov/
TechResources/HumanGenome/medicine/genetest.html#whatis (last modified Oct. 29,
2003) [hereinafter HGPI, Gene Testing] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
For example, most states screen newborns for about eight disorders requiring early
detection and treatment, including phenylketonuria, galaetosomia, and sickle cell disease.
See U.S. General Acccounting Office, Newborn Screening: Characteristics of State
Programs, March 2003, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03449.pdf (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
62. HGPI, Gene Testing, supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. See NCBI, BASIC INTRODUCTION, supra note 39. Gel electrophoresis separates
genes by using an electric current to move dyed DNA fragments through a gel. Id.
Smaller fragments of DNA move faster and further than longer fragments. Id. Scientists
then study the patterns the DNA creates. Id.
65. HGPI, Gene Testing, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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two will bind together, thereby flagging the mutation
and
68
demonstrating whether the individual also carries that gene.
A "linkage" test involves comparing the patient's gene and its
DNA sequence to a "normal" version of the gene. 69 Linkage tests can
be difficult to administer because researchers must examine
chromosome segments from several generations of a family to
determine if the disease is genetic.7" An example of a linkage test
involves BRAC 1 and BRAC 2, the breast cancer genes. To
determine if a woman carries either gene, doctors need to compare
DNA samples from her immediate relatives who had breast cancer
with the identified gene to search for a particular mutation.71 That
mutation is then matched with the woman's genes.72 If the woman's
genes match, and if her family has a history of breast and ovarian
cancer, she has an 80% chance of developing breast cancer.73 If the
woman's genes do not match, she may still develop breast cancerbecause these genes account for only 5 to 10% of all breast cancer
diagnoses.74

Genetic testing can also be accomplished by a much more
rudimentary-if not quite so accurate-method. By studying family
histories, scientists can make predictions about a person's genetic
code.75 The easiest cases are those of monogenetic disorders, such as
Huntington's or sickle-cell anemia.76 Much more difficult to discern
from genetic histories are polygenic disorders such as cancer or heart
disease, since the link from genetic code to symptomatic disease is not
as strong and more affected by environmental factors.77

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, What is Genetic Testing?, at
http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/Frames/genetic-testing-f.html
(last visited Apr. 9,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
71. The
Cleveland
Clinic,
Genetics
and
Breast
Cancer, 2003,
at
http://www.clevelandclinic.org/health/health-info/docs/0300/0392.asp?index=4208
(last
reviewed Dec. 21, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Greely, supra note 10, at 1496.
76. Id.
77. See Denise Casey, What Can the New Gene Tests Tell Us, at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/publicat/judges/j udge.html
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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II. LAWS AND LEGISLATION THAT MAY IMPACT GENETICS AND
EMPLOYMENT

As genetic testing for disease becomes more common, it remains
important to consider how the tests are performed and what they can
disclose. Monogenic disorders, though less common, are more likely
to present themselves through actual symptoms.78
Polygenic
disorders are both more common than monogenic disorders but and
less likely to be caused by genetic variance alone. 79 Employers may
be interested in both forms of disorders as a means to distinguish
among future employees. Various legislative possibilities for limiting
discrimination against employees with potentially unfortunate genetic
futures have been suggested. This Part of the Comment will examine
current laws that may impact an employer's first decision in all three
of the hypothetical scenarios set out above. As the law is today, can
the employer refuse to hire these employees?
Americans with DisabilitiesAct
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was passed to
ensure equal opportunity for people with disabilities in employment,
state and local government services, public accommodations,
commercial facilities, and transportation.8" Under the ADA, an
employer may not ask for medical information prior to extending an
offer to hire.81 Subsequently, an employer may conduct a medical
examination and condition the commencement of work on
satisfactory test results showing that the employee can perform the
essential functions of the job." This exam, if required, must be given
to all entering employees, regardless of disability, and the information
collected must be treated as a confidential medical record. 3 The
employer must demonstrate that the medical exam and inquiries
related to disability are job-related and consistent with business
necessity.84 With test results in hand, the employer may screen out
employees with disabilities if a reasonable accommodation85 cannot

A.

78. See Michael J. Smith, Population-Based Genetic Studies: Informed Consent and
Confidentiality,18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 57, 64 (2001).
79. See LAURIE, supra note 9, at 94-97.
80. See Statement of President George Bush upon Signing S.933, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2000).
82. See id. § 12112(d)(3).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
85. Under the ADA, making "reasonable accommodations" to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability includes making
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be created, or if the individual would pose a "direct threat" to the

health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. 86 The ADA
defines a "direct threat" as a "significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.""

To come under the protection of the ADA, a person must be
disabled. The Act defines the term "disability" in three ways:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.88
The ADA is enforced and regulated in the workplace by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").8 9 EEOC

regulations and their interpretations, however, do not have the force
of law absent a court ruling. 9°

To bring a prima facie case of

employment discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing: "(1) he is a disabled person under the ADA; (2)

he is otherwise qualified to perform his job; and (3) he suffered
adverse employment action because of his disability."9 ' If a person is
found to have a medical condition that does not rise to the level of a
"disability," he would have no recourse under this Act if an employer
refuses to hire him due to his medical condition.9 2 The ADA is "not a

general protection of medically afflicted persons"; rather it protects
those who are discriminated against because of a disability or
"because their employer mistakenly believes them to be disabled.

9' 3

changes in "ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions. .. to enable the disabled
individual to work." Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir.
1995).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
87. Id. § 12111(3).
88. Id. § 12102(2).
89. Id. §§ 12116-12117.
90. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
91. Simms v. City of New York, 160 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
92. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (holding that petitioner's myopia did not rise to
the level of a disability and refusing to apply the ADA).
93. Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997). In
Christian,Judge Posner ruled that a woman's claim that she was fired either (1) because of
the stigma of having hypercholesterolemia (an excessive amount of cholesterol) or (2)
because her treatment for hypercholesterolemia was expensive, was deemed insufficient to
support a claim under the ADA. Id. at 1052. The court held that a medical condition, in
and of itself, does not bring a person within the ADA. Id. at 1053. For example:
Suppose that the plaintiff had a skin disease that was unsightly and also very
expensive to treat, but neither the disease itself nor the treatment for it

2004]

GENETIC DISABILITY

1453

EEOC regulations have interpreted genetic discrimination to
come under the third definition of disability, being regarded as having
such an impairment.9 4 Clearly, the first two definitions would not
apply.95 An asymptomatic employee, an employee afflicted with a

predisposition to disease but who is not currently suffering from any
symptoms, is not, by definition, currently suffering from a physical or
mental impairment. Additionally, the employee has no record of
suffering from an actual physical or mental impairment. The EEOC

claims, however, that employers may mistakenly see the employee as
suffering from a genetic disease and, as such, discriminate against the
employee.
The problem with the EEOC's position-besides the fact that no
court has yet to affirm this judgment 96 -is that employers are not
actually misperceiving a current impairment, but rather they are
would interfere with her work. And suppose her employer fired her
nevertheless, either because he was revolted by her disfigured appearance or
because the welfare plan that he had set up for his employees was unfunded
and he didn't want to incur the expense of the treatment that she required.
Either way he would not be guilty of disability discrimination.
Id.
94. U.S. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Policy Guidance on Executive Order 13,145: To
Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic Information (July 26,
2000), availableat 2000 WL 33407180.
95. However, the EEOC also asserts that someone with an altered gene associated
with a severe disorder would be covered under the "actual disability" prong of the ADA,
because an alteration in a gene causes "cellular and molecular changes leading to
disturbances in cell function." Id. Under the rule of Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
641-43 (1998), the EEOC asserts that such an individual could transmit that altered gene
to an offspring, and so may have a disability. Id. This construction is even more tenuous
than the EEOC's interpretation of the "regarded as" prong, considering the recent rulings
of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
that narrowly defined a "major life activity" to an activity that causes a "substantial"
limitation. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002); Sutton,
527 U.S. at 489; see also Katherine R. Annas, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams: Partof an Emerging Trend of Supreme Court Cases Narrowing the Scope
of the ADA, 81 N.C. L. REV. 835, 848 (2003) (noting that Toyota has overruled Bragdon's
interpretation of a "major life activity" because the Toyota Court requires that such
activities occur daily).
96. The EEOC has settled a case against Burlington Industries under this argument.
See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad
Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under Americans with
Disabilities Act (Feb. 9, 2001), at www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-01-c.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF for
Genetic Bias (Apr. 18, 2001), at www.eeoc.gov/press/4-18-01.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). In that case, the company, without the consent or knowledge of
the affected employees, tested employees for a gene for carpal tunnel syndrome. Id.
After a complaint by those employees to the EEOC, the company settled for $2.2 million.
Id.
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eliminating individuals who might develop a future impairment. 97
They understand quite well that the employee is not currently
disabled but might become so in the future. 98 That statement is also
true of any employee hired without a genetic test. For this reason and
others to be discussed below, the predisposed but asymptomatic
employee is probably not a covered individual for the purposes of the
ADA. 99

At least one court has accepted that tests for predisposition for
disease do not indicate that an employer is misperceiving a current
impairment. In EEOC v. Rockwell International Corp.,'° Rockwell

required applicants to undergo a nerve conduction test prior to
employment in order to discover which applicants were more likely to
develop carpal tunnel syndrome.01° The prospective employees
sought positions requiring constant repetitive motion. 02 Applicants
with abnormal test results were rejected.103 In response, the EEOC
filed suit on behalf of seventy-two job applicants rejected by
Rockwell on the basis of abnormal nerve tests, alleging the company's
policy violated the ADA."°
Rockwell argued that it did not
misperceive the applicants as disabled, and the district court agreed. 1°5
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the case on another basis- that the
EEOC did not show any evidence that the claimants faced significant
restrictions in their ability to meet the requirements of other jobs in
the area."° Most significantly, the court did not challenge Rockwell's
assertion that it did not misperceive the applicants as disabled. 7
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,"" the Supreme Court
97. Holt, supranote 14, at 473-75.
98. Id.
99. In dicta in Bragdon, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the "regarded as" prong in
relation to an asymptomatic HIV patient:
[T]he "regarded as" prong requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant
regarded him as having "such an impairment" (i.e., one that substantially limits a
major life activity). Respondent has offered no evidence to support the assertion
that petitioner regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limited
her ability to reproduce, as opposed to viewing her as simply impaired.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 658 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
100. 243 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2001).
101. Id. at 1014.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1015.
106. Id. at 1018.
107. Id.
108. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
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explained exactly what it interprets the "regarded as" prong to entail:
"(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,
or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities."' 10 9
The Supreme Court's use of the word "has" suggests that the
employer must believe that an employee is currently suffering from
the genetic disease. If the employer does not have this belief, then
the employee is not covered by the "regarded as" prong of the
ADA. 110
Under the hypothetical scenarios presented above, the potential
employees were not afflicted with epilepsy at the time of the hiring

decision. Rather, they carried genes predicting that they might
develop epilepsy at some point in the future."' If an employer
believed that an employee carrying an epilepsy gene was presently
suffering from the disease, then that employee would likely be

covered by the ADA. But in most cases, an employer should know
that unless the employee is currently diagnosed with the disease, a
genetic predisposition amounts to an increased likelihood of
developing the disease at some time in the future, and nothing more.
If the Supreme Court finds that genetic predispositions fall under
the "regarded as" prong, claimants may have difficulty proving that

their genetic predispositions substantially limit one or more major life
activities-or, in this case, that the employer misperceives that the
employee is substantially limited in one or more major life activities.

The Court has yet to rule on whether "working" is a significant daily
activity and in fact has appeared hostile to this notion."2 The Court
109. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
110. Id.; see also Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 749 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the decisive issue under the "regarded as" prong is the employer's
perception of the employee's alleged impairment).
111. An employer looking at this situation may know that epilepsy affects about "[one]
percent of the population[,] making it one of the most common neurological diseases."
See NCBI, GENES AND DISEASE, supra note 34. While epilepsy will vary in severity, all
forms are marked by "recurring seizures resulting from abnormal cell firing in the brain."
Id. Mounting evidence also suggests that repeated seizures can harm the brain, causing
changes that make future seizures more likely, or even causing death. See Linda Carroll,
Mounting Data on Epilepsy Point to Dangers of Repeated Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2003, at F5. "[T]o date, at least twelve forms of epilepsy have been found to possess some
genetic basis." NCBI, GENES AND DISEASE, supra note 34.
112. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 ("Assuming without deciding that working is a major
life activity."); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002)
("Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could be a
major life activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this
difficult question today."). In Toyota, the Court declared that evidence that a plaintiff is
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has ruled that a claimant must show more than inability to perform a
particular job for a particular employer, as this is insufficient to
113
render one disabled under the ADA.
In Sutton, the Supreme Court considered whether twin sisters
with myopia were disabled under the ADA after a potential employer
refused to hire them as pilots because they did not meet sight
standards without corrective lenses. 114 The Court held they were not
disabled (while assuming, but not deciding, that "working" is a major
life activity) because the plaintiffs failed to prove that their vision
condition precluded them from more than a position as a "global
airline pilot.""' 5 "Because the position of [a] global airline pilot is a
single job, this allegation does not support the claim that respondent
regards petitioners as having a substantially limiting impairment.""'
Genetic predispositions may or may not limit an employee from
practicing a particular class of jobs, assuming external presentment of
the disease is likely. Epilepsy, as in the hypothetical scenarios, is one
disease that would likely preclude a greater variation of positions
than other diseases because of the risk of a seizure at an inconvenient
time (for example, while driving a commuter bus). Other genetic
diseases, such as myopia,1 7 are not generally seen as limiting,
particularly where corrective lenses improve much of the disability." 8
Depending on whether the Court takes a narrow or expansive view,
however, epilepsy may not be considered limiting, particularly if it is
correctable with medication. Employee Adam, with a predisposition

unable to perform repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels is insufficient proof that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity.
534 U.S. at 201. Instead, the Court was concerned with whether the plaintiff's health
problem "substantially limits" a "major life activity" which includes "those activities that
are of central importance to daily life ... a category that includes such basic abilities as
walking, seeing, and hearing." Id. at 197. This impairment must "prevent[] or severely
restrict[] the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-term." Id.
at 198 (citing Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provision of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)).
113. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Sutton, " 'the inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working.'" Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)).
114. Id. at 471.
115. Id. at 493.
116. Id.
117. "Myopia" is commonly known as nearsightedness. DORLAND'S DICTIONARY,
supra note 6, at 1215.
118. In Sutton, the Court ruled that correctable conditions are not disabilities. Sutton,
527 U.S. at 488-89. The pilots' argument failed because the airline carrier had an
uncorrected vision requirement, presumably for safety purposes. Id.
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toward epilepsy, may be considered dangerous as an airline pilot. But
as Employee Barbara demonstrates, Adam would not be considered
so dangerous if he were an accountant, since an epileptic seizure in
that position would be unlikely to put others in danger. Thus, the
class of jobs from which Employee Adam may be excluded may not
be so great that the Supreme Court would consider him disabled as
that term is defined by the ADA.119
In his dissent in Bragdon v. Abbott, 2 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist

stated that to find
limited ability to
logical extreme..
some debilitating

an asymptomatic HIV patient disabled because of a
reproduce and raise a child would, "taken to its
. render every individual with a genetic marker for
disease 'disabled' here and now because of some

possible future effects.' 121 While that argument was made in dissent,
in recent years, the majority of the Supreme Court has been
22
extremely hostile to broadening the definition of disability.
When Congress passed the ADA, it expected the Act to apply to
more than 43 million Americans with one or more physical or mental
disabilities.123 Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to
everyone. In Sutton, the Court stated:
Because it is included in the ADA's text, the finding that 43
million individuals are disabled gives content to the ADA's
terms, specifically the term "disability."
Had Congress
intended to include all persons with corrected physical
limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly
would have cited
a much higher number of disabled persons
14
in the findings.

The

Court

reaffirmed

this

position

in

Toyota

Motor

119. However, the courts have often found epilepsy to be a disability. See, e.g., Otting
v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding epileptic plaintiff to be
disabled); Rowles v. Automated Prod. Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2000)
(finding epileptic plaintiff to be disabled, despite being on medication for the illness). But
see Runkle v. Potter, 271 F. Supp. 2d 951, 963 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (refusing a motion for
summary judgment where a jury could find the plaintiff disabled).
120. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). In Bragdon, the Court found that having children was a
major life activity; thus, an asymptomatic HIV patient was "disabled" and covered by the
ADA. Id. at 640-41.
121. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
reproduction is not substantially limited by an asymptomatic HIV infection and, even if it
were, that it is not a "major life activity").
122. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)
(holding that the term "disability" needs to be interpreted strictly because of the
legislative purposes of the ADA); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487 (finding that Congress did not
intend for all people with correctable conditions to come under the ADA).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
124. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
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Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams,25 when it stated: "[T]hese
terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard
for qualifying as disabled ...
In Toyota, the Court considered
whether an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome was disabled when
during her employment she could not do repetitive work requiring
her to extend her arms at or above shoulder level for long periods of
time. 127 The Court held that the employee's problem did not rise to
the level of a disability; instead, to be disabled, an individual must
have a permanent or long term "impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activity that are of central
1 28
importance to most people's daily lives.
Every living person has some form of genetic predisposition for a
disease.12 9
If society begins regarding all genetic defects as
disabilities, the ADA would have to be expanded, and this is
something the Supreme Court does not seem prepared to do.13
Allowing all genetic predisposition for disease to come under the
ADA would weaken the Act and make it less meaningful for the 43
million Americans it was designed to help.
The dissent in the Seventh Circuit's Rockwell decision raised the
issue of employer perception of disability and condemned the idea
that an employer could refuse to hire an employee currently not
disabled, but who may become disabled in the future.1 3 ' As discussed
earlier, in Rockwell the EEOC brought suit for applicants who failed
nerve conductive tests designed to test for a predisposition to carpal
tunnel syndrome.132 The court held that there was no evidence as to
whether the prospective employees were foreclosed from an entire
class of jobs or just those requiring frequent repetition or the use of
vibrating power tools. 33 In her dissent, Judge Wood stated:
I note that this assumption [that nerve testing predicts carpal
tunnel syndrome] was at best highly dubious, and certainly a
contested point of fact. And it is not at all clear to me that as a
matter of law the ADA permits an employer to refuse to hire a
person who is fully qualified to perform certain work, simply
125. Toyota, 534 U.S. 184.
126. ld. at 197.
127. Id. at 184.
128. Id. at 185.
129. Holt, supra note 14, at 485.
130. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).
131. EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (Wood, J., dissenting) (7th
Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 1014.
133. Id. at 1017-18 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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because that individual might at some unspecified time in the
future develop a physical or other disability that would render
her unable at that later date to meet the employer's reasonable
expectations. This smacks of exactly the kind of speculation
and stereotyping that the statute was designed to combat. 134
Judge Wood's criticism applies directly to genetic discrimination.
Yet, an employer might respond to Judge Wood's dissent by arguing
that hiring someone who is predisposed to develop carpal tunnel
syndrome from working with vibrating machines would be both
negligent and would allow a defense under the ADA: the direct
threat. 35 While the ADA defines "direct threat" as a threat to others,
recent EEOC regulations have redefined it as a "threat to self or
others."13' 6 This definition was ruled consistent with the ADA by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal.137 There, the
Court considered whether an oil refinery could refuse to hire a man
with a liver condition that might become worse in such an
environment. 3 8 The Court held that the EEOC regulation was
consistent with the language and purpose of the ADA. 39
Additionally, the Court held that given an individual fact-finding by
the company on this employee's disability, it could refuse to hire
him.14° The Court in Chevron decided this was not an impermissible
use of paternalism as decried by the framers of the ADA.1 41 Further,
the Court noted that Chevron was right to worry about the risk of
violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,142 and to

have been concerned about time lost to sickness, excessive turnover,
litigation under state tort law, and moral concerns.
The question for genetic predisposition is just how "direct" a
"direct threat" must be to qualify for the exception. Under at least
one court's interpretation, a "slightly increased risk" is not enough to
constitute a "direct threat" for purposes of ADA employment

134. Id. at 1018-19 (Wood, J., dissenting).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2002) ("The term 'qualification standard' may include a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the
individualor others in the workplace."(emphasis added)).
137. 536 U.S. 73, 86-87 (2002).
138. Id. at 76-77.
139. Id. at 87.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 85-86.
142. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000)).
143. Chevron, 536 U.S. at 84-85.
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discrimination action. 144 Instead, the court found "there must be a
high probability of substantial harm."'1 45 Such a finding is unlikely to
occur with a predisposition for a genetic disease, except for
monogenic, dominant disorders such as Huntington's disease that are
nearly guaranteed to someday occur. 146 Therefore, if the present
ADA applied to genetic predispositions, employers would have a
difficult time determining such things as what percentage of risk
would qualify as a "high probability." When an employee with a
predisposition for epilepsy applies to be an airline pilot, the employer
may have to choose between being subject to an employment lawsuit
by the pilot or a negligent hiring lawsuit after some form of
accident.

47

Privacy advocates usually suggest that an employee with a
genetic predisposition could be tested repeatedly, thus catching in
time the newly-symptomatic epileptic prior to any bad results.1 48 But
employers and the public should not have to take that risk. Even if
most diseases would not appear suddenly, an employer would always
have to wonder how often testing is necessary-an expensive and
dangerous proposition. This raises other questions, such as whether
an employee who knows he is becoming symptomatic would be liable
for fraud to the employer or negligence to anyone injured.
Otherwise, an employee would have little reason other than his own
safety to self report because of the risk of job loss after the
reporting. 4 9 Clearly, a better model is needed if the ADA is to apply
to genetic predispositions.
Other current laws may be useful against genetic discrimination,
but they are as flawed as the ADA. The following Part will discuss
some of these laws.
B.

Executive Order 13,145

As a stopgap measure to prevent genetic discrimination,
President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13,145 on February 8,
144. Simms v. City of New York, 160 F. Supp. 2d 398,407 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
147. See Samantha French, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: The Employer's Coin
918-23 (Sept. 5, 2002), at
Toss, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0015,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltrOO15.html (on file with the North

Carolina Law Review).
148. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1540 (explaining that airline pilots undergo routine
medical screenings).
149. Clearly, someone who was both a symptomatic epileptic and an airline pilot would
be a direct threat to the health of the public and to him or herself.

2004]

GENETIC DISABILITY

1461

2000.150 Executive Order 13,145 prohibits the use of "protected
genetic information," including information from genetic tests,
information about genetic tests of the individual's family, and
information about the occurrence of disease within that family.15'
Federal employers may not use such information to:
[D]ischarge, fail or refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate
against any employee with respect to the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment of that employee,
because of protected genetic information with respect to the
employee, or because of information about a request for or the
receipt of genetic services by such employee. 52
Additionally, the employing department may not use such
information to deprive the employee of employment opportunities,
request or require such information, or disclose protected genetic
information with respect to the employee.'53 The Executive Order
provides for very limited exceptions to these general rules.154 An
employer may request or require protected genetic information if the
request is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act'55 and if it is used
only to diagnose a current disease that could prevent the employee
from performing the essential functions of the position.'56 Genetic
monitoring of the biological effects of toxic substances in the
workplace is permitted if an employee has given knowing and
voluntary consent and if the employer learns of test results only in
aggregate terms that "do not disclose the identity of specific
employees."'57 The Order also purports to place no limitations on the
"statutory authority of a Federal department or agency to ...
promulgate or enforce workplace safety and health laws and
58
regulations." 1
150. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000), reprintedas amended in
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West Supp. 2003).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Executive Order does allow the employing department to release such
information to the employee who is the subject of the information, at his request, or to an
occupational or health researcher in certain conditions, or if required by a court order. Id.
154. Id.
155. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, §§ 501, 505. The
Rehabilitation Act prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities by
federal employers. Id.
156. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000), reprintedas amended in
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West Supp. 2003).
157. Id.
158. Id.

1462

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

This last statement appears, however, to be false. As discussed in
Chevron, the company was worried about violating OSHA
regulations15 9 by employing persons who had predispositions to health
damage when exposed to certain chemicals. 6° Under this Executive
Order, if the company was a federal employer, the company would
have been able to test employees in the aggregate for genetic changes,
but could not, even given poor results, learn the test results of
individual employees. Further, this Order appears to contradict the
EEOC's interpretation of the "direct threat" defense. It would
appear that this Order would prevent an employer from learning
whether an employee has a predisposition to a disease, such as
epilepsy, that could cause a direct threat. Therefore, the Order is
over-inclusive because it ties employers' hands in their efforts to
create a safe workplace. But it is also under-inclusive: executive
orders apply only to federal government employers, so they have
little effect on the majority of employers. In other words, Adam and
Barbara may or may not be covered by the Executive Orderdepending on whether they are federal employees-and Charles
could choose to run the risk of epileptic seizures and be paid for it.
C. Title VII
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 it is unlawful
for an employer to base employment decisions, such as hiring or
firing, on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 62
Prior to its passage, employment was seen as a private contract
between the employer and employee. 63 The Act was enacted, inter
alia, to help raise the status of African-Americans, whose economic
inferiority had become a pressing public policy issue.164 Today, an
anti-discrimination norm has broad acceptance, including the belief
that an employer should not discriminate on the basis of race or sex
because those characteristics reveal little about how an employee will
perform a job.'65

Title VII, as currently written, appears to be an ineffective tool
159. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is a division of the U.S.
Department of Labor. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651
(2000), requires employers to provide a safe and healthful workplace, free of recognized
hazards. Id.
160. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84-85 (2002).
161. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
163. Kim, supra note 14, at 1515-16.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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to deter genetic discrimination. Few diseases have been found to
correspond closely with race, sex or national origin.' 66 The case may
be made that if an employer discriminates based on a predisposition
to sickle cell anemia, a disease closely associated with AfricanAmericans, or with Tay-Sach's disease, a disease closely associated
with Ashkenazi Jews,167 then that employer is actually discriminating

based on race or religion. But not all carriers of sickle cell anemia are
African-American, nor are all carriers of Tay-Sach's Jewish. Thus, it
would seem that, on its face, Title VII, as currently written, has little
utility for combating genetic discrimination.
Some commentators support amending Title VII to include
genetic discrimination. 68 One commentator argues that Title VII is a
more appropriate legal remedy for genetic discrimination than the
ADA, because the ADA allows employers to discriminate based on a
disability if the employer can show some degree of danger to the
applicant.169 Further, defining genetic predispositions as a disability
creates misperceptions and stereotypes surrounding individuals with
impairments, thus creating fear about genetic information. 17 0 For
employers, amending Title VII would afford them the opportunity to
avoid the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement, so an
applicant with a genetic predisposition would be free to make
employment decisions regardless of potential health risks, and an
employer would be free to disregard necessary accommodations for
the applicant as a result of those risks.171

However, these arguments in favor of amending Title VII
illustrate why amending Title VII is not appropriate. Employers
should be able to consider whether a job poses a health risk to an
applicant. Defining some genetic predispositions as disabilities does
not necessarily stigmatize those who have predispositions that may
become disabling. Employers should have to make reasonable
accommodations for those who have disabilities as defined by the
166. Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 406.
167. Gina Kolata, Using Genetic Tests, Ashkenazi Jews Vanquish a Disease, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at F6.
168. See Holt, supra note 14, at 481-84 (supporting amending Title VII by adding
genetics to the statute).
169. Id. at 481.
170. See id. at 482.
171. Id. at 483; see also Int'l Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198-99, 206-07 (1991) (holding that it
was illegal under Title VII for a company to refuse to hire women based on the fact that
the risk of the female employees' infertility was too great, particularly where male
infertility was also at risk due to exposure to lead).
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ADA, unless such accommodations are unreasonable or the job poses
a direct threat to the applicant, other employees, or the public.
Furthermore, a genetic predisposition is not quite like race,
color, or national origin.7
A genetic predisposition, while
determined before birth and beyond an individual's control, may
supply some useful information that employers need to know in order
to help workers and ensure the general public safety. 173 Furthermore,
anti-discrimination
legislation
protecting
against
genetic
discrimination does not redress systematic historical injuries, as is the
case with legislation prohibiting race discrimination. 17 4 Enactment of
Title VII punishes those who discriminated in the past for an
irrational reason, and theoretically it imposes no more costs on an
employer than making any employment decision would.1 75 Title VII
makes an employer hire an employee who, but for the past systematic
discrimination, would be the same as any other employee.'76 Genetic
discrimination, however, is more like the ADA in that it makes an
employer hire an employee who is not the same as any other
employee and, in fact, may need a costly accommodation to perform
the required tasks. 77 Thus, legislation such as the ADA that would
ban genetic discrimination may create allocation difficulties:
employers who had nothing to do with causing or creating an
individual's genetic code must hire those who are more likely to
become disabled in the future, and by so doing, increase the cost for
these employers relative to their competition. 7 Title VII, unlike the
ADA, does not contain any exceptions for direct threat or compelling
business necessity. Employers would fare worse under a modified
Title VII that simply banned the use of genetic information in hiring
decisions. The potential benefits of controlled genetic discrimination
of employees, such as for safety reasons, would be eliminated if
genetic discrimination is added to Title VII. As Title VII currently
stands, it does not apply to, or help, Adam, Barbara, or Charles.
172. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1520-23 (explaining that genetic predispositioning does
not arouse the same kind of concerns as racial hatred of disfavored groups). But see Holt,
supra note 14, at 477-83 (advocating for a Title VII amendment because "[a] genetic
predisposition is similar to race, color and national origin").
173. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1521 (noting that "variations in an individual's genetic
material may provide information that is highly relevant to job performance").
174. Id. at 1522.
175. Id. at 1518-19.
176. Id.
177. See Justin Nelson & Samuel Issacharoff, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With DisabilitiesAct?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 307,353-57 (2001).

178. Id.
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D. State Law
At least thirty-two states have enacted statutes against using
genetics in employment decisions.'79 For example, Massachusetts
enacted chapter 151B,' which prohibits: refusals to hire based on
genetics; soliciting of genetic information; administering genetic tests
as a condition of employment; questioning about family histories; or
terminating an employment relationship based on genetic
information.'81 Massachusetts does not allow exemptions to the act

for worker and public safety or a direct threat defense.'82
Other states have legislation that is as wide ranging, although
state laws "almost universally prohibit employers from making hiring,
firing, or other employment decisions based on genetic
information."' 8 3 Some states only prevent decisions based on DNA
179. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 25; see also Feldman &
Katz, supra note 3, at 390 (noting that twenty-six states have enacted anti-genetic
discrimination employment laws); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2002)
(making it unlawful to discriminate because of genetic information or atypical hereditary
cellular or blood trait); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1(a) (McKinney 2003) (making it unlawful
to discriminate based on genetic predisposition or carrier status); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.402 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of genetic
information or because an individual refused to take a genetic test).
180. The text of the Massachusetts statute is as follows:
SECTION 23A. Said section 4 of said chapter 151B, as so appearing, is
hereby further amended by adding the following subsection:
19. (a) It shall be unlawful discrimination for any employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or licensing agency to
(1) refuse to hire or employ, represent, grant membership to, or license a
person on the basis of that person's genetic information;
(2) collect, solicit or require disclosure of genetic information from any
person as a condition of employment, or membership, or of obtaining a
license;
(3) solicit submission to, require, or administer a genetic test to any person as
a condition of employment, membership, or obtaining a license;
(4) offer a person an inducement to undergo a genetic test or otherwise
disclose genetic information;
(5) question a person about their genetic information or genetic information
concerning their family members, or inquire about previous genetic testing;
(6) use the results of a genetic test or other genetic information to affect the
terms, conditions, compensation or privileges of a person's employment,
representation, membership, or the ability to obtain a license;
(7) terminate or refuse to renew a person's employment, representation,
membership, or license on the basis of a genetic test or other genetic
information; or
(8) otherwise seek, receive, or maintain genetic information for non-medical
purposes.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2000).
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 411; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463,
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tests; other states prohibit gathering information on employees'
families."8 Where states do not completely ban the use of genetic
information, employers may not condition employment on consent to
submit to a genetic test or to supply genetic information. 185 Some
states allow genetic testing for reasons of business necessity, to
determine a bona fide occupational qualification, or to investigate a
worker's compensation claim.'86 Other states allow employers to
discharge employees if the employer can show that the employee's
genetic makeup may put them at greater risk for illness because of the
particular occupational environment. 8 7 Some states refuse to allow
on test results,
employers to take adverse employment action based
88
safety.
worker
to
mean
results
the
what
matter
no
Inconsistent state law has led some commentators to propose
both model state legislation 189 and model federal legislation.190
Current state law approaches are flawed because they are
inconsistent in their definitions of what is protected and in their
remedies for employers. 91 A federal approach is needed to provide
employers, particularly employers with multi-state operations, with
certainty, and to provide the critical controls and exceptions for
safety. While states serving as laboratories may be useful in other
contexts, a federal approach to regulating the use of genetic
information in employment is necessary to protect all workers
B.3 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination based on genetic tests received by the employer);
NEV. REV. STAT. 613.345 (2000) (prohibiting employers from requiring genetic tests as a
condition of employment).
184. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A (1999).
185. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 3614.2(C) (1999).
186. See IOWA CODE § 729.6(7) (1993).
187. See OR. REV. STAT. § 654.227(6) (1999).
188. See IOWA CODE § 729.6(7) (1993); see also Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 41216. For example, section 296 of the New York Executive Law provides "statutory
protection preventing adverse actions by employers based on the test results." Id. at 418
(citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(19)(c)).
189. Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 424-27 (proposing a model statute "designed to
protect employees' rights to keep genetic information private and beyond their employers'
reach").
190. See generally Kathryn E. Cox et al., Model Act for Genetic Privacy and Control, 88
IOWA L. REV. 121 (2002) (developing a model act on use of genetic information).
191. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463, B.3 (barring only employer genetic testing); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 19302 (West. Supp. 2000) (barring both employer testing and
employer use of genetic information); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1306 (Supp. 2001) (allowing
an employer to use genetic information when it is directely related to ability to do a job);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 3614.2(C) (prohibiting use of genetic testing on information as a
condition of employment or continural employment); see also Feldman & Katz, supra note
3, at 412-16 (noting variations in state laws and the need for a comprehensive federal
approach).
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equally. Furthermore, the field of genetics and the scientific concepts
Therefore, a uniform federal
surrounding it are complicated.
approach would allow employers, employees, and other interested
parties involved in the discussion to speak the same language.
Because state law is so varied, it is unclear whether it applies to
Adam, Barbara, or Charles.
E.

Heath InsurancePortabilityand Accountability Act

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA")' 9 is designed primarily to protect the privacy of health
information, but it also prohibits insurance carriers from engaging in
genetic discrimination.19 3 The statute helps to prevent individuals
who transfer from one job to another from losing health insurance
because of a genetic defect. 94 HIPAA, however, does not apply to
employment discrimination, and thus, as enacted, would not help an
employer decide whether to hire an individual with a genetic
predisposition. HIPAA could make an employer who provides its
own group health plan think twice about hiring an employee with a
serious genetic predisposition, because the employer could not hire
the employee and fail to provide health insurance for such an
employee.
Additionally, HIPAA provides incentives for fewer
employers to offer health insurance to workers because of the
inability to discriminate based on genetic predispositions.19 Clearly,
HIPAA does not help Adam, Barbara, or Charles because HIPAA
does not apply to employment discrimination.
F.

Pending Legislation

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003196
("Act") purports to prohibit employers from refusing to hire or
discharging any individual because of protected genetic information
or to classify such employees in a way that limits employment
opportunities. 197
Further, the Act prevents employers from
requesting or collecting protected genetic information except to

192. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); see Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 406-07.
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.

195. See Taradash, supra note 17, at 1381-82 (noting that "HIPAA does not prohibit
employers from refusing to offer health coverage as part of their benefits package").
196. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. § 202
(2003), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
197. Id.

1468

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

monitor biological effects of toxic workplaces, and then only if the
employees have provided informed consent and the employer
receives the results only in aggregate terms that do not disclose the
identity of specific employees. 19 8 Thus, this legislation suffers from
some of the same problems plaguing the Executive Order and some
state statutes: it does not provide the employer a "direct threat"
defense, nor does it allow an employer to focus on individual
employees who have a predisposition for a genetic abnormality
aggravated by the occupational environment, a standard that may be
required for the employer to remain in compliance with its OSHA
obligations.'99 Furthermore, the pending legislation falls into the trap
of genetics exceptionalism, where genetic information is treated as
superior to ordinary health information. Thus, the Act may be widereaching, but it is not the best solution for employers or employees.
Under the Act, Adam could end up dying of a seizure while
flying a plane and Charles could someday learn of the increased
likelihood of epilepsy. Barbara is probably helped by the legislation,
because an employer could not ask her about her disability, but this
legislation is clearly inadequate, particularly as to public safety.
III. PROPOSED REMEDIES AND THEIR IMPACT

Commentators proposing remedies to potential genetic
discrimination fall into several clearly divided philosophical camps.
Most commentators believe that the ADA as written does not
provide protection for genetic predispositions.2 "' They often agree
that other legislation presently enacted is also inadequate, such as
inconsistent state laws and the limited usefulness of Title VII to the
few genetic diseases most commonly associated with race or sex.
Some commentators advocate a model statute that would preclude
the use of genetics in hiring, firing, and other employment decisions
as an appropriate mechanism to eradicate genetic discrimination.20 '
198. Id.
199. Occupational Safety and Health Standards § 1910, U.S. Dept. of Labor, available
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owastand.display-standardgroup?p-toc-level=l+ppartnumber=1910.
200. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1515; Taradash, supra note 17, at 1368-69. But see Paul
Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discriminationin the Workplace,
3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 265 (2000) (arguing that the ADA does protect
against the misuse of genetic information by employers).
201. See Cox et al., supra note 190, at 121; Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 425-27.
Another problem with a model statute is its future interpretation. The ADA has a decade
of legal interpretation-albeit controversial-to lend credence to its potential applicability
to prohibit genetic discrimination. New statutes, by definition, have none, and are even
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Many others subscribe to either a privacy model or an economic
efficiency model, and argue for particular solutions based on their
ideological positions.
A.

The Privacy Model

At least one commentator has argued for a privacy model which
would forbid employers from asking for or using an employee's
genetic information. 20 2 The commentator argues that the risk of
misuse by employers is too great because employers will equate
predispositions with actual diseases. 2 3 Employers will avoid hiring
people with predispositions for diseases with more severe
symptoms. 1 4 More particularly, use of any genetic information
threatens individual autonomy because it takes employment choices
away from the individual, while absolute privacy would help
safeguard that autonomy.205 As a more practical matter, genetic
predispositions are not always as obvious as race or sex. Thus, if
employers have access to any genetic information, proving unlawful
use of that information will be very difficult. A privacy model
alleviates this concern because discrimination on the basis of genetic
20 6
traits "becomes impossible.
Despite these arguments, a pure privacy model is not the best
solution for employers or employees. Employees may wish to tell an
employer about their favorable genetic condition, as a way to sell
themselves to their employer.2017 If we deny the relatively genetically
healthy employee the ability to tell an employer about his genetic
condition, we disadvantage that employee. 20 8 Hypothetically, if this
practice became common, employees who remain silent about their
genetic condition (because the law allows them to do so) may be
presumed by their employers to have a poor genetic predisposition.
Additionally, this solution ignores the benefits of the genomics
revolution, such as allowing an employer to protect worker safety
through advance knowledge of future illness. It also ignores the fact
that inefficient allocation of information, where the employee knows
of a poor prognosis but the employer does not, could harm both the
more likely to be attacked under the theory of "genetics exceptionalism," discussed infra
Part III.C.
202. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1543.
203. Id. at 1534.
204. See id. at 1534-35.
205. Id. at 1537.
206. Id.
207. See Taradash, supra note 17, at 1378.
208. Id.
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employment and insurance markets. 209 The privacy model does not
allow for progressive policies to protect fellow workers, the public or
the employee himself from situations in which the employee's health
could be at risk. Failing to provide such protections, even though the
science is readily available, could further open the employer up to
accusations of negligent hiring, violations of OSHA, and increased
worker's compensation problems, in addition to the loss of
productivity.210
As for the difficulties in claims of genetic
discrimination, just because something is hard to prove does not
necessarily make it a bad law. 211 Congress could modify the ADA or
Title VII if it believes that plaintiffs are facing too much difficulty in
proving their cases; however, Congress has yet to do this.
B.

The Economic Model

Some commentators argue that genetic discrimination legislation
should not be enacted because it destroys market efficiency.2 12 Under

the economic model, anti-discrimination legislation interferes with
the freedom to contract and prohibits both the employer and the
employee from making the most efficient decisions possible.2 3
Further, anti-discrimination legislation such as the ADA creates

negative allocation effects by putting too much strain on some
employers but not others. 214 The use of anti-discrimination law would

increase the total amount of expenditures for dealing with genetic
discrimination beyond what it would cost to provide subsidies to the
209. See id. at 1383-86 (arguing that just as an asymmetry of information reduces the
quality and quantity of goods available in the open market, a similar result will occur with
an asymmetry of information in health insurance). But see Greely, supra note 10, at 1489
(discounting the notion that asymmetrical information may limit health coverage to many
people or that use of genetic information is likely in employment decisions).
210. See generally French, supra note 147 (discussing the possibilities of negligent
hiring, negligent retention, negligent entrustment and OSHA responsibilities). For
example, it may be negligent hiring for a trucking company to hire an epileptic employee
because a trucking company must determine the risk that its employees pose to third
parties. Id. 118. Similarly, it may be negligent retention to continue employing such an
employee as a truck driver if he has suddenly developed epilepsy. Id. 19. Negligent
retention claims are based on the employer's duty to retain "fit and competent"
employees. Id.
211. For example, medical causation is often hard to prove, but unless the United
States moves to a no fault system, it remains important in assigning liability in medical
negligence cases.
212. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 29, at 1462 (arguing for the efficiency gains of a
"transparency regime"); Epstein, supra note 28, at 9 (referring to asymmetrical
information as a "fraud" on the employer); Taradash, supra note 17, at 1382 (arguing for
economic efficiency).
213. Epstein, supra note 28, at 21.
214. See id.
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genetically unfortunate and tax breaks to the employers who hire
them. 215 Moreover, an anti-discrimination approach may also lead "to
the adoption of general and neutral rules that are inefficient for the
employer and society at large. '216 For example, instead of spending
money to make workplaces safe for all employees, it is more efficient
if the workers who would be particularly affected by the work
environment are simply not hired.
However, these commentators admit that the most genetically
unfortunate would likely be penalized under this model.217 Therefore,
in exchange for facing this discrimination, these commentators argue
that these individuals should receive subsidies from the "public
purse. ' 2 1 8 More specifically, "the government should fund the
additional costs associated with hiring or insuring individuals with
a public job so that
genetic defects,' 219 and perhaps even provide
220
individuals can do useful work for society.
Like the privacy model, the economic model also has its
problems. Allocation efficiency is not always the most worthy goal.
On its face, this model seems to most disadvantage those with the
poorest genetic predispositions because those who want to work may
not be able to find an employer who is willing to hire them.
Proponents of this position often argue that we should transform
health and insurance systems to provide universal health care
because, without employment, it is likely that those with the poorest
predisposition will also lack health insurance.22' Providing universal
health insurance has not happened yet, and it is unlikely to ever
happen considering both the historic budget deficit 222 and the history
of health care reform in the United States.2 3 Unlike Canada and
Great Britain, the United States has never had a nationally-subsidized
215. See id.
216. Id. at 21-22. For example, making factory improvements to reduce the exposure
of benzene for every worker would likely cost a great deal more than removing the one
worker with a special sensitivity to it.
217. Id. at 20.
218. Id. at 21.
219. Id. at 21; see also Taradash, supra note 17, at 1354 (arguing that the "voluntary
submission of genetic information" by employees would be "exchanged in consideration
for certain benefits").
220. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 29, at 1482 (arguing that subsidies must be
provided for genetic justice, perhaps taking the form of direct cash payments on public
jobs).
221. Taradash, supra note 17, at 1382 n.164.
222. Edmund L. Andrews, CongressionalDeficit Estimate May Exceed a Half-Trillion,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at A17 (discussing the United States economic projections).
223. Rothschild, supra note 29 (discussing the failure of President Clinton's health care
plan).
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health care system and movements to start such a system have not
been successful. 224 While universal health care might be the best
solution, it is not something upon which this Comment depends in
constructing a possible solution to genetic discrimination today.
C. The ADA Model
A few commentators would agree with this Comment's position
that the ADA can be modified to supply the answer to the problem of
how to deal with the use of genetic information in employment, but
these commentators do not usually specify who should be covered
under the ADA.225 This failure gives rise to criticism known as
"genetics exceptionalism. ''226 Genetics exceptionalism refers to
making an irrational decision that if a person has a genetically-based
disease they should be protected by the ADA or other legislation, but
not if their disease is environmentally based.227
Genetics
exceptionalism is an argument also lodged against stand-alone
genetics discrimination legislation such as the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act. 228 Recall that ordinary illness is not a
disability and, as such, is not protected by the ADA. The solution
offered in this Comment takes this problem into account by treating a
genetic illness the same as an environmentally-based illness.
Additionally, opponents of modifying the ADA argue that the Act is
unfair because it places burdens on private employers with disabled
employees applying for jobs. 2 9 Thus, opponents contend that the risk
spreading of the ADA is inconsistent and unfair to private
employers.23 °
Furthermore, some commentators oppose modifying the ADA
224. Id.
225. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 29, at 1481.
226. See generally Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do

We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 671 (2001) (arguing for
more comprehensive, genetic-specific legislation to avoid the "spiral of genetics
exceptionalism").
227. See Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic DiscriminationExceptional? 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 77,80-81 (2003).

228. See id. (revealing that critics argue that laws that "define genetic discrimination as
discrimination on the basis of the results of a test of a person's genetic material, such as an
examination of DNA ...[,] will fail to capture many instances of discrimination on the
basis of genetic predisposition to disease").
229. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
230. For example, the minimum wage is also an unfunded mandate on employers, but
since it applies to all employers, the risk is spread. Whereas, under the ADA, one
employer may be put at a disadvantage as to other employers because of the need to make
accommodations for a disabled employee. See Nelson & Issacharoff, supra note 177, at
348-51.
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because the Act,
with its direct threat defense, is open to claims of
"paternalism. '231 Paternalism essentially means making choices for
others in order to help them, without considering whether the
individual involved desires that help. 32 The concept is generally used
to defend policies such as requiring seatbelt or helmet use, the
contract doctrine of unconscionability, and any other court decisions
that suggest the State is making decisions for an individual's own
good, without considering whether the individual would agree.233 In

Chevron, the plaintiff alleged that application of the "direct threat"
standard to the facts of his case would inappropriately engage in
1
paternalism of the sort forbidden by the ADA.234
But as the Supreme
Court in Chevron noted, allowing an interpretation of direct threat
that did not include the individual employee is not the sort of

paternalism that Congress attempted to curtail.235 Instead, it is only

rational-and consistent with OSHA-to allow employers to take
into consideration, after an individual determination, whether a

specific job might be harmful because of that employee's health
condition.2 36 Just as an innocent bystander does not want a high-rise
worker with vertigo 237 working above him, so should a rational

employee with vertigo show concern for his own health by refusing
such a job.
However, without paternalistic legal intervention in the case of

genetic predispositions, employees may be willing to take increased

231. See Holt, supra note 14, at 481.
232. See JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 13 (1984). Paternalism can be defined as "X
acts paternalistically in regard to Y to the extent that X, in order to secure Y's good, as an
end, imposes upon Y." Id.
233. See generally Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 489 (1995) (looking at areas of the law that appear to have paternalistic intent and
measuring them against a law and economics model). Burrows defines paternalist legal
interventions as those that "deliberately interfere with people's freedom of choice, for
example, the freedom to choose to consent to an injury inflicted by another person, or the
freedom to sell a right." Id. at 491.
234. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85 (2002). The ADA was
designed to root out irrational, paternalistic decisions by employers that certain disabled
employees could not perform a specific job, rather than to require an employer to ignore
specific and documented risks to the employee himself, even if that employee would be
willing to take such risks. Id. at 86.
235. Id. at 85-86.
236. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000)); Feldman & Katz, supra note 3, at 396-97
(noting that employers may test employees for hypersensitivity to certain toxins).
237. "Vertigo" is defined as dizziness characterized by a spinning sensation. Mayo
Clinic Staff, Dizziness, at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=DS00435 (Oct. 10,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

1474

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

risks with their health. 38 Thus, where employment is on the line,
employees may be more likely to take unreasonable risks if allowed
to do so. 239 It is hard to predict an accident or the magnitude of injury
from an accident. 241 When such an underestimation occurs, "people
will take risks that they would have been unwilling to take if they had
had full information and had been able to process the information
efficiently.""24 Therefore, even though the occupational environment
may be harmful, an employee may still be willing to take a job if he
believes that any accidents that may occur will not involve him.
Further, for at least two accident risk scenarios it has been well
established that people fail to understand their own risk: where
people feel they are in control of the risk and imagine that owing to
exceptional skill in risk avoidance they will not suffer; or where
cognitive dissonance induces a pretense that one is not facing a
serious risk because of other characteristics of that activity, including
a high income or excitement.2 42
But even the anti-discrimination statutes, as written, practice a
form of paternalism by making employees learn whether they carry a
genetic predisposition that would be a direct threat. As one
commentator has noted, some individuals may prefer not to know
their genetic predisposition:
The situation might be seen as analogous to the problem of
the incapax. The individual who is incapax cannot choose
for herself and so choices must be made for her. In the same
way, the individual who is ignorant of genetic information
might be seen as a pseudo-incapax, and therefore it might be
assumed that it is legitimate to make choices about the
genetic information on her behalf.... It is far from clear,
however, how one would determine an individual's best
238. Bohrer, supra note 29, at 760; see Burrows, supra note 233, at 500.
239. See Bohrer, supra note 29, at 761. Bohrer has an interesting discussion on the
application of John Rawls's philosophy to this question, noting that "risk ostriches"those who refuse to learn their genetic predispositions-and "non-risk adverse"
individuals will, by taking these risks, cause harm both to themselves and their loved ones.
Id. According to Bohrer, "[b]argaining for freedom under such circumstances is
bargaining for the acceptability of such avoidable losses and the costs that they impose on
others.... I think the rational bargainers would determine that their self-interest actually
provides a sufficient incentive to limit their future freedom to inflict avoidable losses on
others." Id.
240. See Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on
Judgment and Decision-Making,6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 180-85 (2000); see
also Burrows, supra note 233, at 500 (noting instances where paternalistic laws deal with
safety measures because risk is hard for an individual to determine).
241. Burrows, supra note 233, at 500.
242. Id.
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interests concerning genetic information. 43
Therefore, if we do not want the government determining an
individual's best interests with respect to genetic information, perhaps
the employer should be able to learn the result of genetic tests
without informing the employee of the result. This would necessarily
happen with the employee's consent-plus a release of liabilityassuming the employer uses good faith in determining whether the
employee has a condition that would be impacted by the work
environment. Legislation or laws, including some state statutes and
Executive Order 13,145, that require employers to make available to
employees their test results may be seen as a reverse violation of
privacy, and paternalistic in their own way by reducing autonomy in
learning health care information.2' Despite claims to the contrary,
paternalism is not only unavoidable, but also is not necessarily the
evil it is often made out to be.
D. A Modest Proposal
A possible solution to all these problems exists that would both
avoid genetics exceptionalism and protect individuals with poor
genetic futures.
Congress should modify the ADA to stop
discrimination against individuals predisposed to a disease that, if
symptomatic, would be covered by the ADA in most symptomatic
individuals.245 The EEOC could promulgate regulations designating
which diseases are most likely to be found disabling based on a
scientific risk analysis of an individual's predisposition becoming
symptomatic. These regulations would require an individualized
genetic assessment be conducted to analyze the nature of the risk of
symptomatic genetic disease, the likelihood that symptoms cannot be
controlled or corrected by medication, and the likelihood of actual
disability percentage associated with a symptomatic form of the

243. LAURIE, supra note 9, at 204.
244. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong.
§ 202 (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (stating that if employers are allowed to
request or collect genetic information to use for biological effects of toxic substances,
employers are required to inform the employee of individual monitoring results). There is
also an argument that any consent to receive such information should be greeted
skeptically because "in many contexts and especially in those of employment and
insurance, the individual from whom consent is to be obtained is in a substantially weaker
position than the party seeking consent." LAURIE, supra note 9, at 205.
245. See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define
Disability: A Proposalto Amend the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
243, 282-96 (2002) (developing a list of diseases that typically fall under the ADA).
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disease.2 46 For instance, an individual with epilepsy is covered by the
ADA in most cases, even if the epilepsy can be mostly controlled by
medication, because epilepsy usually affects major life activities.247
In addition to this modification, the Act should unambiguously
allow employers to refuse to hire an applicant if the applicant's
disease is such that if symptomatic the applicant would be barred
from that particular job because of a direct threat to the applicant or
to others. This modification would allow sensible results for Adam,
Barbara, and Charles. In the cases of Adam, the airline pilot
predisposed to epilepsy, or Charles, the oil refinery worker whose
epilepsy could be made more likely by exposure to oil, both would be
covered under the ADA-but, for both, the employer would be
allowed a refusal to hire because of a direct threat. In the case of
Barbara, the accountant predisposed to epilepsy, the ADA would
also apply but, unlike the situation with Adam or Charles, the
employer would not be allowed a refusal to hire on the basis of
Barbara's genetic predisposition because she would be considered
"genetically disabled."
For those with genetic predispositions that would not normally
come under the ADA when symptomatic, the employer would be
allowed to choose whether to employ the individual without
implicating the ADA. This result may seem harsh at first, because of
the narrow conditions the Supreme Court has placed on the definition
of disability.248 In fact, the great majority of people with predisposed
genetic diseases probably would not be able to argue that their case
came under the protection of the ADA. This result, however,
provides a quid pro quo for the employer: in exchange for taking on
those employees with the most potentially dangerous genomes
(assuming no direct threat), the employer is assured that the
government will not interfere with other employment decisions as
would be the case under the other models.
Where an employee is predisposed to a disease that would not
generally be considered a disability when symptomatic, such as a
condition that can be corrected with medical treatments, the ADA
246. For example, Congress could set a predisposition risk percentage above which the
law applies, such as ten percent risk or perhaps a two-fold increase in risk over the general
population. For a discussion regarding general principles of genetic risk assessment, see
RIMOIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 654-74. Until genetic information becomes more certain,
the percentage should be low so as to make the Act apply to a greater number of
employees with potential unfortunate genetic futures.
247. Rothstein et al., supra note 245, at 289.
248. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1999).
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would not apply. These conditions, by definition, are likely to be of
lesser scope, insurance cost, and hardship to both the employer and
the employee. Therefore, the employer would have less reason to
discriminate against them in the first place. Because most employees
(and their employers) have some form of genetic abnormality, the
employer would likely find negligible the differences between
employees with readily fixable or inconsequential illnesses. The costs
of hiring (from advertising the position to medical testing) would
become too great if employers fixated on finding the "perfect"
genetic employee.
Results under this statutory construction are also less likely to be
as harsh as one may initially suspect. Theories of cognitive
behavioralism suggest that when an employer has full information
about the genetic predispositions of more than one employee, the
employer would be less likely to discriminate against the majority of
less than severe genetic predispositions.249 One researcher looked at
the "notion of evaluability" to explain the interplay between the
precision of an emotional impression and its meaning for decisionmaking.250 The researcher asked people to assume they were music
majors looking at a used music dictionary." One dictionary had
20,000 definitions, but a tattered cover. 2 A second dictionary had
10,000 definitions, but was like-new. 2 3 When subjects evaluated both
dictionaries simultaneously, subjects were willing to pay more for the
larger, tattered dictionary. 254 But when the dictionaries were
evaluated separately, subjects were willing to pay more for the
smaller, like-new dictionary. 255 This scientist argues that:
[W]ithout a direct comparison, the number of entries is hard to
evaluate, because the evaluator does not have a precise notion
of how good or how bad 10,000 (or 20,000) entries are....
Evaluability can thus be seen as an extension of the general
relationship between the variance of an impression and its
weight in an impression-formation task. 6
This theory suggests that if an employer knows only one thing
249. See Slovic, supra note 240, at 175-77 (discussing an experiment concerning the
notion of evaluability).
250. Id.

251. Id. at 175.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id.
256. Id. at 175-76.
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about an employee, i.e., his genetic predisposition, the employer will
have difficulty evaluating the significance of that attribute. Further,
cognitive behavioralism theory suggests that if a specific concept has a
negative feeling associated with it, then that feeling may overcome
logic suggesting that the possibility of the negative event is unlikely. 7
For instance, other research in the field finds that the perception of
risk and society's response to risk is strongly linked with "the degree
to which a hazard evoked feelings of dread. 258 Scientists have
discovered that activities associated with cancer are seen as riskier
and in more need of regulation than activities associated with less
dreaded causes of ill health, such as accidents. 259 Thus, to counteract
the feelings of dread an employer may feel upon learning that a
potential employee has a genetic predisposition to lung cancer, the
employer must also know that other prospective employees have a
genetic predisposition to diabetes, heart disease, epilepsy, or other
diseases.260
The perceived risk of employing a particular person is likely to
lessen as an employer's belief of benefit associated with that
employment increases.261 Under cognitive theory, when a person
likes an activity, he or she is likely to judge the risks as low and the
benefits as high, but when the person dislikes it, to judge the risk as
high and the benefits as low. 262 This suggests that any risks of real
genetic discrimination may be more likely to fall on lower-skilled
workers than on higher-skilled workers. 263 Employers of higherskilled workers will likely have fewer potential applicants to choose
from, and will likely view choosing the most-highly skilled applicant
as more important than worrying about a potentially poor genetic
predisposition. 26 And, if the real risks lie with lower-skilled workers,
then, until genetic testing is as simple as getting one's genome microarrayed on a chip, employers are less likely to make an investment in
investigating a lower-skilled worker's genetic identity-except for
257. Id. at 179-80.
258. Id. at 180.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.at 182.
262. Id. at 181.
263. Indeed, one case concerning genetic discrimination involved low-skilled workers
at Burlington Industries suing for unconsented genetic tests as to carpal tunnel syndrome.
See supra note 96.
264. Of course, this would not be true for the most dangerous predispositions because
that would likely overcome the employer's positive feeling for the benefits of the
employee, and greatly increase the employer's worry about risk.
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specific occupational diseases such as in the case of Chevron211 or
Rockwell Industries.2 6 In those cases, this model would find such
employees not to be covered because of the direct threat to
themselves. Additionally, employers of lower-skilled workers may be
less worried about genetic diseases because of a belief that most
workers change jobs regularly, and thus the onus of any genetic
disease will fall on some other employer.
Rationally, an employer should be unlikely to discriminate based
on genetics because everyone has some potential genetic disease in
their background. For an employer to differentiate between an
employee with potential heart disease and an employee with potential
diabetes would not make much sense because both are potentially
chronic illnesses. Each employee that is screened and rejected costs
the company money. And, if the employer acts irrationally, the
potential employee can look for another position. It is not illegal for
employers to act irrationally
when making employment decisions, and
26 7
it should not become SO.
As for genetics exceptionalism, consider the case of two workers,
one with a genetic predisposition to a disease, and one without. Once
the disease becomes symptomatic, both workers will have mild
illnesses along with weakness and loss of sensation in their
extremities-one the result of a genetic disease and the other due to
environmental causes. 268 By banning discrimination based on genetic
diseases, without anything more, one worker is seemingly more
protected than the other, unless the non-genetically diseased worker
can show that her condition constitutes a "disability" under the ADA.
But because the courts interpret that term narrowly, workers with
mild physical ailments are not considered "disabled."
Under this Comment's proposed restructuring of the ADA, this
apparently unfair result would not occur. If the genetic disease was
generally known to cause a "disability" under the ADA, the worker
with the genetic predisposition would be protected up until the time
the disease becomes symptomatic. The worker without the genetic
predisposition would not have to worry about genetic discrimination
prior to the manifestation of the disease. After the manifestation of
the disease, traditional ADA interpretation would apply to both: if
the disease has mild physical symptoms, then there would be no
265.
266.
267.
general
268.

Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Heilman, supra note 227, at 85 ("In employment law, by contrast, there is no
requirement of rational behavior.").
See Kim, supra note 14, at 1510.
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protection for either. If the disease has severe physical symptoms
that limit a major life activity, then there would be protection for
both. This modification to the ADA serves to put a worker in as
good a position as he or she would have been in-but for the genetic
predisposition-unless such a predisposition is not generally known
to cause disability. In those cases, an employer is less likely to
discriminate in the first place, or be able to argue a business necessity
for such discrimination.
The primary problem with this model is that under current law,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that an ADA inquiry is based on
an individual assessment of the disease and its impact on a major life
activity.269 By applying the ADA to presymptomatic genetic diseases,
that inquiry is obviously not possible-no one knows how debilitating
the disease will be once it becomes symptomatic. It is possible that
someday science will have a better idea of how a disease will manifest
itself, based on genetics alone, but until then, the ADA will have to
be modified to provide for the results detailed above.
Therefore, based on the benefits of allowing employers some
access to specific genetic information, but in order to deter genetic
discrimination against those affected the most by unfortunate genetic
predispositions, this Comment proposes the following changes to the
ADA:
Section 12102 Definitions of disability:
Additions in italics: (D) A genetic predispositionfor a
disease that if symptomatic would likely be covered by
this Act, provided the likelihood of future illness is
greaterthan ten percent.
Section 12111 Definitions:
Additions in italics: The term "direct threat" means a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. In
the case of a genetic predisposition,a "direct threat" may
include any disease that if symptomatic would likely pose
a direct threat to the employee or to others, provided the
likelihood of future illness is greaterthan ten percent.
The change to section 12102 makes clear that genetic
predispositions for diseases that normally are disabling would be
covered by the ADA. The change to section 12111 makes clear that

269. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999).
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employers can use the "direct threat" defense against these same
genetic predispositions, but only for diseases that could cause harm to
the individual or others within the occupational environment.
Including a threshold of ten percent--or some other scientifically
significant number-would both limit claims of disability for
predispositions that are extremely unlikely to ever occur and provide
a form of individualized inquiry as previously required by United
2
States Supreme Court precedent. 11
CONCLUSION

As written, the ADA most likely does not cover genetic
discrimination, nor are other current laws useful in preventing this
form of discrimination. State laws are extremely varied, providing
inconsistent results. Proposed federal legislation would not allow
employers to make workplaces safer by both screening individuals for
genetic predispositions that may be harmful to that individual or to
others and letting the employer know which employees are most
affected. Many commentators have proposed various models for
dealing with these problems, but each model has its own limitations.
The privacy model would ignore the benefits provided by the
genomic revolution, and the economic efficiency model would harm
the most genetically unfortunate. Other anti-discrimination statutes
fail because they elevate genetic information above all else, thus
potentially treating two workers with the same disease differently.
By modifying the ADA to forbid genetic discrimination of
employees who would likely be considered disabled if symptomatic,
this Comment provides a workable middle ground. Additionally, this
model allows employers to retain use of information that may make
workplaces safer. Genetics should not be looked at as exceptional
when compared to other employee illnesses, and this model provides
that answer.
JENNIFER CHORPENING

270. See id.

